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How important are collateral constraints for the propagation and am-
pli￿cation of shocks? To address this question, we analyze a stochastic
general equilibrium version of the model by Kiyotaki and Moore (JPE,
1997) in which all agents face concave production and utility functions
and are generally identical, except for the subjective discount factor. We
document that the existence of costly debt enforcement plays an important
role in the endogenous ampli￿cation generated by the model. Limiting the
amount of borrowing up to a reasonable fraction of the value of the col-
lateral asset, makes the ampli￿cation generated by collateral constraints
sizable and signi￿cantly larger than what we observe either in the repre-
sentative agent version of the model, or in the version of the model where
ine¢ ciencies in the liquidation of the collateralized asset are neglected.
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11 Introduction
Standard Real Business Cycle theories succeed in accounting for business cycle
observations of aggregate quantities, such as output, investment and consump-
tion, by relying mainly on large and persistent aggregate productivity shocks.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998) show that if debt is fully secured
by collateral, even small and temporary productivity shocks can have large and
persistent e⁄ects on economic activity. Kiyotaki and Moore￿ s theoretical work
has been very in￿ uential and an increasing number of papers have documented
the contribution of collateral constraints to business cycle ￿ uctuations. Col-
lateralized debt is becoming a popular feature of business cycle models.1 A
common assumption in this strand of the business cycle literature is that debt
enforcement procedures are costly and lenders limit the agents￿ability to borrow
to a fraction of the value of their collateral.
Kocherlakota (2000) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) demonstrated that col-
lateral constraints per se are unable to propagate and amplify exogenous shocks.
In particular, Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) document that the endogenous am-
pli￿cation generated by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) is driven by unorthodox
assumptions on agents￿preferences ￿i.e. lenders￿linear utility ￿and technology
￿i.e. borrowers￿linear technology in the collateral asset. As a result, in a mod-
i￿ed version of the model in which all agents face the same concave preferences
and production technologies, no ampli￿cation is found. The authors ￿nd that
models with collateral constraints require implausible parameters￿values in or-
der to generate ampli￿cation. Moreover, allowing for the input of production to
be elastically supplied decreases the sensitivity of output to productivity shocks.
Papers on the ampli￿cation role of collateral constraints have neglected the
role of ine¢ ciencies in the liquidation of the collateralized assets. As docu-
1For instance, on the international transmission of business cycles, see Iacoviello and
Minetti (2007); on the role of the housing and collateralized debt in the transmission and
ampli￿cation of shocks, see Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010); on the macro-
economic implications of mortgage market deregulation, see Campbell and Hercowitz (2005);
on the business cycle implications for durables and non-durables see Sterk (2010); on the role
of nominal debt in sudden stops, see Mendoza (2006) and Mendoza and Smith (2006); on
overborrowing Uribe (2007).
2mented by Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2008) debt enforcement pro-
cedures around the world are signi￿cantly ine¢ cient. Worldwide an average of
48 percent of an insolvent ￿rm￿ s value is lost in debt enforcement. Thus, lim-
iting the amount lent to a fraction of the value of the asset turns out to be a
reasonable assumption.
We aim to reconcile these two strands of the business cycle literature by
exploring the role of costly debt enforcement procedures in the ampli￿cation of
productivity shocks through collateral constraints. To this purpose we allow for
costly repossession of the collateralized asset in a stochastic general equilibrium
version of the model by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) modi￿ed as in Cordoba and
Ripoll (2004). Accordingly, we assume that a fraction of the collateral value is
lost in debt enforcement and lenders are not willing to lend the full amount of
the collateral value. Moreover, all agents face concave production and utility
functions and are generally identical, except for the subjective discount factor.
This paper provides several insightful results. First, even under collateral
constraints, when ine¢ ciencies in the liquidation of the collateralized asset are
neglected, the misallocation of the factor of production in the economy is neg-
ligible. The reason is as follows. Borrowers, limited in their capital holding by
the existence of credit constraints, experience higher marginal productivity of
capital. Thus, lower degrees of ine¢ ciencies in the credit market, as proxied by
higher Loan-to-Value (LTV henceforth) ratio ￿i.e. the fraction of the collateral
asset up to which agents are allowed to borrow ￿imply less sizable di⁄erences
between borrowers and lenders in terms of their capital holding and, thus, their
marginal productivity. We show that when agents can borrow the full amount
of their collateral value, the allocation of capital under collateral constraints is
very close to the allocation in the frictionless economy, and credit frictions in
the form of collateral constraints do not have sizable implications for aggregate
production.
Second, the sensitivity of output to productivity shocks depends on the
redistribution of capital between borrowers and lenders and varies in a non-
linear way with respect to the LTV ratio. The intuition is as follows. Lower
3LTV ratios imply larger di⁄erence between borrowers￿and lenders￿productivity
and more sizable gains from a better allocation of resources. Nevertheless,
the redistribution of capital to the borrowers is limited by the low LTV ratio
itself that restricts the access to external funds. In contrast, high LTV ratios
allow for a larger redistribution of capital among agents but are associated to
smaller di⁄erences in the marginal productivity of capital. Thus, the overall
gains from the redistribution are low. At an intermediate level of LTV ratios,
collateral constraints amplify the e⁄ects of productivity shocks on output and
generate sizable endogenous persistence even under standard assumptions on
preferences and technology. For reasonable LTV ratios collateral constraints
signi￿cantly amplify the e⁄ects of productivity shocks on output even under
standard assumptions on preferences and technology.
Robustness analysis also delivers interesting results. Allowing for capital to
be elastically supplied dampens the ampli￿cation of shocks only when agents
can borrow almost the all amount of the collateral asset. When capital is re-
producible, movements in the relative price of capital enter the measurement of
aggregate output and directly a⁄ect the transmission of shocks to output. Since
lower LTV ratios are related to larger di⁄erences in productivity between bor-
rowers and lenders, more capital is needed to ￿ll the productivity gap and the
sensitivity of the relative price of capital to productivity shocks is larger. Thus,
under the assumption of ine¢ ciencies in the liquidation of the collateralized as-
set, the relative-price e⁄ect generates much larger endogenous ampli￿cation and
persistence of shocks on output than in the benchmark model.
We also ￿nd that the role of the LTV ratio for ampli￿cation is independent
from the other parameters and our results are, thus, robust to alternative cali-
brations. Moreover, when agents cannot borrow the full amount of the collateral
value, the e⁄ect of changes in the LTV ratio on the solution of the model are
not similar to changes in other parameters. Using the local identi￿cation proce-
dures developed by Iskrev (2010.a), we ￿nd that in the ￿rst-order approximate
solution all parameters are locally identi￿able and, thus, no multicollinearity in
terms of the solution of the model is found between the degree of ine¢ ciencies
4in the credit market and the other parameters. Thus, we can conclude that the
e⁄ect of changing the degree of ine¢ ciency in the debt enforcement procedure
is not locally almost the same as changing other parameters.
Last, we relax the common assumption of always-binding constraints and
deal with the occasionally-binding constraints using a penalty-function algo-
rithm.2 As a result, we document that our results also hold under alternative
assumptions regarding the binding nature of the collateral constraint.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model
economy and Section 3 the steady state implications. Section 4 studies the
transmission and ampli￿cation of productivity shocks. Section 5 conducts ro-
bustness. Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2 The Model Economy
We adopt a two-agents close-economy model ￿ la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
modi￿ed as in Corboda and Ripoll (2004) to introduce standard assumptions on
preferences and technology. The economy is populated by two types of agents
who trade two kinds of goods: a durable asset and a non-durable commodity.
The durable asset (k) does not depreciate and has a ￿xed supply normalized to
one. The commodity good is produced with the durable asset and cannot be
stored. At time t there are two competitive markets in the economy: the asset
market, in which one unit of the durable asset can be exchanged for qt units of
the consumption good, and the credit market. The economy is populated by
a continuum of heterogeneous agents of unit mass: m1 Patient Entrepreneurs
(denoted by 1) and m2 Impatient Entrepreneurs (denoted by 2). Ex-ante het-
erogeneity on the subjective discount factor ￿￿2 < ￿1 < 1 ￿is assumed in order
to impose the existence of ￿ ows of credit in this economy.
Agents of type i ￿i = 1;2 ￿maximize their expected lifetime utility as given
2For the use of a "barrier method" to deal with inequality constraints, see among others
Den Haan and Ocaktan (2009), Den Haan and De Wind (2010), Kim, Kollmann and Kim









s.t. a budget constraint




where yit is the individual production, kit is a durable asset, cit; a consumption
good, and bit; the debt level.
Technology is speci￿c to each producer and only the household that started
the production has the skills necessary to complete the process. Nevertheless,
agents cannot precommit to produce. This means that if household i decides not
to put his e⁄ort into production between t and t+1, there would be no output
at t+1, but only the asset kit. Agents are free to walk away from the production
process and from debt contracts between t and t + 1. This results in a default
problem that makes lenders willing to protect themselves by collateralizing the
borrower￿ s asset. Lenders know that if the borrower chooses not to produce
and neglects his debt obligations, they can still get his asset. However, lenders
can repossess the borrower￿ s assets only after paying a proportional transaction
cost, [(1 ￿ ￿)Etqt+1kit]. Thus, lending is limited to a fraction, ￿, of the value
of the asset, such that next period￿ s repayment obligation cannot exceed the
expected value of next period assets,
bit ￿ ￿Et [qt+1kit]: (1)
The lower ￿; the more costly, and, thus, ine¢ cient the debt enforcement
procedure. The fraction ￿, referred to as the LTV ratio, should not exceed one
and is treated as exogenous to the model.












6where Fki;t is the marginal product of capital. The ￿rst equation relates the
marginal bene￿t of borrowing to its marginal cost, while the second shows that








greater than or equal to the expected discounted marginal product of capital.
Heterogeneity in the discount factors ensures that in equilibrium patient
households lend and impatient households borrow. Thus, for impatient agents,
the marginal bene￿t of borrowing is always bigger than its marginal cost. If




￿ ￿2;t = ￿2EtUc2;t+1: (4)
Moreover, borrowers internalize the e⁄ects of their capital stock on their ￿nan-
cial constraints. Thus, the marginal bene￿t of holding one unit of capital is
given not only by its marginal product but also by the marginal bene￿t of being














Collateral constraints alter the future revenue from an additional unit of capital
for the borrowers. Holding an extra unit of capital relaxes the credit constraint
and, thus, increases their shadow price of capital. This additional return encour-
ages borrowers to accumulate capital even though they discount the revenues
more heavily that lenders. As long as the marginal product of capital di⁄ers
from its market price, borrowers have an incentive to change the capital stock.
The lenders￿capital decision is instead determined at the point where the








In the benchmark model the durable asset, k, does not depreciate and has a
￿xed supply normalized to one.
Both agents produce the commodity good using the same technology:
yit = Ztk￿
it￿1 (7)
7where Zt represents a temporary aggregate productivity shock. The shock fol-
lows an AR(1) process. Unlike Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), we assume that
agents have the same concave production technology. Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) take the two groups of agents to represent two di⁄erent sectors of the
economy. As already highlighted by Corboda and Ripoll (2004) this assump-
tion contributes to exacerbate ampli￿cation in the model. Thus, we assume that
agents have access to the same concave production technology: ￿1 = ￿2 < 1:
The total stock of capital kt is given by:
kt = m1k1t + m2k2t: (8)
The following conditions also hold
yt = m1y1t + m2y2t = m1c1t + m2c2t; (9)
m1b1t = ￿m2b2t: (10)
3 Steady State
3.1 Benchmark Parameter Values
We set the model￿ s parameters to values commonly used in the literature.3 Pa-
tient households￿discount factor is set equal to 0.99, such that the average
annual rate of return is about 4 percent. As a benchmark case, we set the dis-
count factor for impatient agents, ￿2, equals 0.91 and the fraction of borrowers,







we set the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ￿, equal to 2.2. For the share of
capital in production we set ￿ = 0:4. The persistence of the aggregate produc-
tivity shock is set equal to 0.55. See section 5.2 for robustness to alternative
parameters￿value.
3See, among others, See among others, Iacoviello and Minetti (2007), Iacoviello (2005),
Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Campbell and Hercowitz (2005), Sterk (2010).
8For an illustrative purpose, we assume a LTV of 85 percent. Experimental,
institutional and macro evidence suggest a calibration for ￿ below one. Djankov,
Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2008) ￿nd an average of 48 percent of the ￿rm￿ s
value is lost in debt enforcement worldwide, around 24 percent among OECD
countries and about 14 percent in the US, which correspond to a LTV ratio of
76 and 86 percent, respectively.
Iacoviello (2005) using limited information methods, estimate a business
cycle model for the US economy and reports a LTV ratio of 89 percent for
the entrepreneurial real estate and 55 percent for the household real estate.4
Osborne(2005) report an average LTV ratio in the US mortgage market of 75-
80 percent, while Calza et al (2010) document a typical LTV ratio of 80 percent.
According to Calza et al (2010) the typical LTV ratios imposed on new loans
in the mortgage market vary signi￿cantly among OECD countries and range
between 50 percent in Italy and up to 90 percent in the Netherlands and the
UK. Similar ratios are reported by Osborne (2005).
3.2 Credit Market and Deterministic Steady State
In what follows, we analyze how the deterministic steady state of the model is
a⁄ected by the equity requirements as proxied by ￿. In the deterministic steady




￿ ￿2;t = ￿2Etuc2;t+1:
















uc2 = (￿1 ￿ ￿2)uc2; (11)
4Flow of funds data for the US over the last 3 decades give an average ratio of outstanding
loans over total assets for the non farm non ￿nancial business sector of about 79 percent.
9As long as ￿2 < ￿1 < 1, the lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing
constraint for the impatient household is strictly positive. Thus,
b2 = ￿ [qk2] and k2 =











represents the di⁄erence between the price of capital and the amount he can
borrow against a unit of capital, i.e. the downpayment required to buy a unit
of capital. The higher ￿ the lower the downpayment requirement.
Figure 1 shows the marginal productivity of capital for the two groups of
agents as a function of ￿ in the benchmark model. Using the equations repre-
senting the households￿optimal choice of capital evaluated at the steady state








￿1 [1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿(￿1 ￿ ￿2)]




Thus, the steady state allocation of capital depends on the subjective discount
factors, the population weights for the two groups of agents, and ￿. Compared
to the frictionless case, the allocation under credit constraints reduces the level
of capital held by borrowers and implies a di⁄erence in the marginal produc-
tivity of capital for the two groups of producers. The higher ￿ the lower the
di⁄erence between borrowers￿and lenders￿marginal productivity and the larger
the borrowers￿share of total production. Since total output is maximized when
the marginal productivity of the two groups is identical, collateral requirements
distort total production below the e¢ cient level. However, in the absence of
costly liquidation procedures the allocation of capital between the two groups
of agents is close to the e¢ cient allocation and the loss in terms of aggregate
output is negligible.
104 Productivity Shocks in the Benchmark Model
4.1 Impulse-Responses
Now, we consider the response of the model economy to a productivity shock.
We assume that the economy is at the steady state level at time zero and
then is hit by an unexpected increase in aggregate productivity of 1 percent.
An aggregate shock raises production and thus the earnings of both groups of
agents. See Figure 2. As the shock hits the economy, borrowers, initially limited
in their capital holdings by borrowing constraints, increase their demand for
productive assets. This allows the agents to more easily smooth the e⁄ect of the
shock. In order for the capital market to clear, lenders have to decrease their
demand for capital. The user cost of holding capital increases. Movements in
the relative price of capital, altering the value of the collateral asset, a⁄ect the
ability to borrow. Thus, borrowers￿expenditure decisions are a⁄ected not only
by the direct impact of the shock but also by the larger availability of credit
resulting from a rise in the value of their collateral. Due to the higher marginal
productivity of capital experienced by the borrowers, the positive e⁄ect of an
increase in aggregate productivity on total production is propagated over time.
4.2 Ampli￿cation and Persistence
Kiyotaki and Moore￿ s theoretical work shows that collateral constraints may
generate large ampli￿cation of productivity shocks. However, Cordoba and
Ripoll (2004) document that the ampli￿cation generated by the model is driven
by two unorthodox assumptions: the linearity of the borrowers￿ production
technology in the collateral asset and the lenders￿linear utility function in con-
sumption. According to their results, when agents face concave preferences and
technology no ampli￿cation is endogenously generated by collateral constraints
under standard parameter values. In what follows we investigate the role of
LTV ratios for the ampli￿cation of shocks through collateral constraints when
borrowers and lenders face the same concave production technology and utility
and the parameters are set to values commonly used in the literature. Since in
11the benchmark model the ￿rst impact of the shock is equal to the shock itself, we
look at the second-period e⁄ect of the shock. We show that the magnitude of the
endogenous ampli￿cation delivered by collateral constraints crucially depends
on the fraction of the asset used as a collateral in the credit market.
Strictly speaking, the second-period elasticity of total output with respect
to technology shocks can be written as in Cordoba and Ripoll (2004):







The ￿rst term is the productivity gap between constrained and unconstrained
agents, ￿ represents the share of capital in production, while
y2
y is the produc-
tion share of constrained agents, and ￿k2z is the elasticity of borrowers￿capital
with respect to the shock ￿i.e. the redistribution of capital to impatient agents.
As we have already shown in section 3.2, the fraction of total output produced
by constrained agents increases with ￿ since more e¢ cient enforcement proce-
dures induce a better allocation of capital in the economy. However, for the
same reason, the productivity gap decreases with ￿. These two opposite forces
contribute to a non-linear shape of the second-period impact of the shock on
total output. Figure 3 plots the second-period variation in output (left panel)
and the cumulative response over a 20-quarter period (right panel) w.r.t. the
fraction ￿ of the collateral value up to which agents￿can borrow.
The model features negligible ampli￿cation in only two parametrization:
autarky and fully e¢ cient debt enforcement procedures. These parameterization
of the model correspond to the case in which either the production share or
the productivity gap are close to zero, respectively. In the absence of a credit
market ￿i.e. ￿ = 0 ￿capital is allocated in a very ine¢ cient way and borrowers￿
share of total output is close to zero. So, the gains from a better allocation of
resources are potentially very big. However, the redistribution of capital induced
by the shock itself is limited since impatient agents cannot ￿nance their capital
expenditure through the credit market. The ampli￿cation of the shocks on total
production is, indeed, negligible. Easier access to external funds generates larger
redistribution of capital and enhances the endogenous ampli￿cation generated
12by the model. However, as ￿ increases the di⁄erence in the marginal productivity
of capital between lenders and borrowers shrinks. When ￿ approaches unity the
allocation of capital between borrowers and lenders is such that the productivity
gap is indeed negligible and the economy is very close to the e¢ cient equilibrium.
Thus, as in Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) we ￿nd no ampli￿cation in this special
case.
For intermediate values of ￿ the model with collateral constraints can gener-
ate ampli￿cation and persistence of productivity shocks of non-negligible mag-
nitude. The second-period e⁄ect and the cumulative e⁄ect over a 20-quarter
period go hand in hand documenting no trade-o⁄ between ampli￿cation and
persistence of productivity shocks with respect to changes in ￿. Moreover, the
e⁄ect of the shock on output can be much stronger and persistent than the re-
sponse generated by the representative agent model. In this latter framework,
the economy is populated only by patient agents and there are no limits to
credit. Over a 20-quarter period the cumulative deviation of output from the
steady state can be as large as almost 2 times the variation of output induced
in the representative agent version of the model.
The analysis conducted above assumes that borrowers and lenders di⁄er only
in terms of their subjective discount factor. Allowing also for heterogeneity
also in technologies and preferences, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), gener-
ates larger ampli￿cation of shocks for any given ￿: In particular, Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) assume linearity for the borrowers￿production function and for
the lenders￿utility function. Assuming a linear production function in capital
for the borrowers (concave for the lenders) would imply a constant marginal
productivity of capital for this group of agents and, thus, a larger productivity
gap and more sizable potential gains from the redistribution of capital. Instead,
linearity of the lenders￿utility function (concavity for the borrowers) would im-
ply a constant real interest rate. If lenders are willing to provide additional
funds without any rise in the real interest rate, borrowers￿increase in capital
expenditure and production is more sizeable. Under these two assumptions on
technology and preferences, the elasticity of borrowers￿capital to productivity
13shocks would be higher. Thus, the ampli￿cation of the shock on output would
be even more sizable for any given ￿.
5 Robustness Analysis
In the following we check for the robustness of the results to alternative model￿ s
assumptions, parameters￿values and solution method.
5.1 Reproducible Capital
Does allowing for the input of production to be elastically supplied reduce the
ampli￿cation e⁄ect of collateral constraint?
According to Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), if capital is not ￿xed but rather
optimally supplied, the ampli￿cation role of collateral constraints is further
reduced. Following Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) we now allow for reproducible
capital and assume that each agent is able to produce both consumption and














where yit represents the technology for producing consumption goods and hit
is the production for capital goods with k
j
it￿1 ￿j = c;h ￿being the stock of
capital used as an input of production in the two sectors, respectively. Total
individual production is given by
Fit = yit + qthit:
It is possible to express the amount of capital allocated to each type of produc-
tion as a fraction of the total capital owned by each agent, as follows
kc
it￿1 = ￿tkit￿1; (15)
5In this way we avoid creating a rental market for capital, and make the model directly
comparable to those of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
6The assumption of decreasing returns in the production of investment goods is equivalent
to assume convex adjustment costs for investments. Capital is assumed to depreciate at a rate










: Thus, the allocation of existing capital between the
two productions depends on the current relative price of capital.7 The total




t + qt (1 ￿ ￿t)
￿]: (16)
Each agent￿ s capital stock evolves according to
kit = (1 ￿ ￿)kit￿1 + hit:
Figure 4 compares the output￿ s reaction to the productivity shock for dif-
ferent values of ￿. The ￿rst- and second-period response of output is displayed.
The results show signi￿cant ￿rst-period ampli￿cation. However, the endogenous
ampli￿cation generated by the model declines with higher LTV ratios. Given
that an economy with a high LTV ratio displays a smaller productivity gap
between lenders and borrowers, less capital is redistributed to the borrowers.
Thus, their demand for capital rises by a smaller margin, which dampens the
increase in the relative price of capital. Since in the model with reproducible
capital, variations in its relative price enter the measurement of total output,
the decline in the sensitivity of the relative price of capital directly a⁄ects the
sensitivity of total output to productivity shocks.
In the second period both the relative-price e⁄ect and the redistribution of
capital between groups of producers contribute to ampli￿cation. As in the model
with capital in ￿xed supply, the second-period response displays a non-linear
shape w.r.t. ￿. However, the endogenous ampli￿cation generated by the model
with elastic capital supply is generally larger than in the benchmark model.
7In any given period each agent allocates the existing capital to produce either consumption






















The relative price of capital equals the ratio of the marginal productivity of capital in the two
sectors. Thus, the amount of capital allocated to each type of production equals a fraction of
the total capital owned by each agent.
15Thus, the result of a reduction in the second-period ampli￿cation due to the
introduction of elastic capital supply highlighted by Cordoba and Ripoll (2004)
holds only for values of ￿ close to one.
5.2 Parameters￿Value
Are our results robust to alternative calibrations? is ￿ di⁄erent from the other
parameters regarding its e⁄ects on the ampli￿cation and persistence of produc-
tivity shocks?
A few papers highlighted the role of other parameters for ampli￿cation. In
particular, Pintus (2011), using a version of the model with capital accumulation
showed that sizable ampli￿cation and persistence can be generated through high,
but still empirically plausible, values of relative risk aversion, ￿; Kocherlakota
(2000) using a small open economy version of the model highlighted the need of
an uncommonly high capital share in production, ￿, to generate ampli￿cation
of productivity shocks; Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) concluded that in response
to a one-time unexpected shock, sizable ampli￿cation can be generated only by
assuming implausibly high values of the relative risk aversion, ￿, together with
uncommonly high capital share in production, ￿. Previous analysis neglected
the role of ine¢ ciencies in the liquidation of the collateral asset and are, thus,
based on the assumption that ￿ equals one.
Results presented above show that for values of ￿ below unity the model
with collateral constraints can generate persistence and ampli￿cation of non-
negligible magnitude even under standard parameters￿values. In this section
we investigate how other parameters a⁄ect the relationship between ￿ and am-
pli￿cation and persistence of productivity shocks. Figure 5 documents the sen-
sitivity of the results to alternative parameters￿values. We consider parameters￿
values in the range suggested by the empirical literature.8 In accordance with
8We choose values for the discount factor, ￿2, in line with previous evidence. In particular,
see Lawrance (1991) for estimates of discount factors for poor households in the range (0.95,
0.98); for an empirical distribution of discount factors Carroll and Andrew Samwick (1997)
using information on the elasticity of assets with respect to uncertainty ￿nd that it ranges
in the interval (0.91, 0.99) and Samwick (1998) using wealth holdings documents that mean
discount factors of around 0.99 for about 70 percent of the population and below 0.95 for
16previous authors, we ￿nd that for ￿ equal one larger ampli￿cation is generated
by higher values of ￿, m and ￿. Higher values of the risk aversion means that
impatient agents are more willingness to smooth the e⁄ect of the shocks through
borrowing and thus a more persistent e⁄ect of the shock. A larger fraction of
borrowers, m, means a larger fraction of total capital held by this group of
agents. This implies a larger share of output is accrued to borrowers and thus,
a more sensitive response of total output to shocks. Regarding m and ￿ the
same result holds for alternative values of ￿ ￿i.e. larger ampli￿cation and per-
sistence is delivered by higher values of m and ￿ for any value of ￿. In contrast,
our ￿ndings highlight a non-monotonic relationship between the ampli￿cation
generated by alternative values of ￿ and the values of ￿ and ￿2.
Regarding the share of capital in production, we compare the results for
￿ = 0:4, which corresponds to the standard de￿nition of capital, with ￿ = 0:7,
which re￿ ects a broader de￿nition of capital that includes both physical and
intangible capital. See, for instance, Angeletos and Calvet (2006). We ￿nd
that output ampli￿cation is not a strictly increasing function of the capital
share. The relation between ￿ and the sensitivity of output to productivity
shocks is clearly non-linear with respect to ￿. A higher ￿ generates larger
ampli￿cation and persistence of productivity shocks only under high LTV ratios.
Thus, Kocherlakota (2000) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) results on the need
of uncommonly high capital share in production, do not hold for any given value
of ￿. In fact, standard values for the capital share in production are su¢ cient
to amplify the e⁄ect of shocks and generate sizable endogenous persistence in
economies with LTV ratios lower than 95 percent.
We are particularly interested is understanding the role of ￿2 for ampli-
￿cation. Changes in this parameter have direct e⁄ects on the allocation of
about 25 percent of households.
Regarding the fraction of borrowers in the economy, Campbell and Mankiw (1989) estimate
around 40 percent of the population to be rule-of-thumb consumers; Jappelli and Pagano
(1989) using the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances estimates 20 percent of the population
to be liquidity constrained.
We choose values for the relative risk aversion in line with previous studies and in the range
of the estimated distribution by Chiappori and Paiella (2008).
17capital between agents. See equation (12). Figure 6 shows that, similarly to ￿;
higher values of ￿2 reduce the productivity gap and increase the output share
of borrowers. However, ￿ and ￿2 are very di⁄erent in terms of their e⁄ects on
ampli￿cation. As shown in ￿gure 7, for reasonable values of ￿2 the e⁄ect on the
productivity gap always dominates and as ￿2 gets close to ￿1 the endogenous
ampli￿cation generated by collateral constraints is reduced.9 Nevertheless, we
￿nd a non-monotonic relation between ￿2 and ￿ in terms of ampli￿cation. In
particular, higher values of ￿2 dampen ampli￿cation and persistence for high
values of ￿ while, amplifying the e⁄ects of the shock for lower values of ￿:10
Summarizing, the results presented above document that models with col-
lateral constraint require uncommon assumptions about technology and utility
in order to generate ampli￿cation only for a particular assumptions regarding
￿;i.e. ￿ equal unity.
We ￿nd worth highlighting that results presented in this section document an
independent role of ￿ in generating ampli￿cation. In particular, independently
of other parameters￿values, the model features a non-linear relationship between
the value of ￿ and the ampli￿cation and persistence generated by productivity
shocks. Negligible ampli￿cation is always only found for values of ￿ either close
to zero or close to one. Moreover, for intermediate values of ￿ the endogenous
ampli￿cation and persistence generated by the collateral constraint is always
larger than in the representative-agent version of the same model.
5.2.1 Local Identi￿cation Analysis
Is the e⁄ect of changing ￿ locally almost the same as changing other parameters?
In previous sections we studied the e⁄ects of di⁄erent parameters on the
response of output to shocks. The sensitivity of output to shocks is only one
of the several aspects of the model. This section report a more comprehensive
analysis on the e⁄ect of di⁄erent parameters for the solution of the model. We
investigate if the e⁄ect on the structural characteristic of the model obtained
9If ￿2 equals ￿1 the model collapses into the representative-agent version of the model.
10Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), already document that higher values of ￿2 exhacerbate am-
pli￿cation, as long as, ￿2 is not too close to ￿1.
18by changing ￿ can also be obtained by changing other parameters. Due to the
di¢ culty in deriving explicitly the relationship between the parameters of the
model regarding the model￿ s dynamics, we use the local identi￿cation method-
ology developed by Iskrev (2010.a).11
First, we test for local identi￿cation of the model￿ s parameters ￿ =f￿;￿2;￿;￿;m;￿zg
in terms of the model￿ s solution. A parameter ￿i is (locally) weakly identi￿ed
if either (1) the matrix ￿(￿) that collects the reduced-form parameters of the
solution of the model is insensitive to changes in ￿i or (2) if the e⁄ects on ￿(￿) of
changing ￿i can be o⁄set by changing other parameters.12 Using these criteria,
we ￿nd that all parameters are identi￿ed in a neighborhood of the benchmark
parameters￿values.
The second condition is particular interesting since it allows us to under-
stand if the e⁄ect of changing ￿ is locally almost the same as changing other
parameters. We compute the correlation between the column of the Jacobian









￿ ￿ ￿for any
di⁄erent value of ￿: Correlation among parameters in terms of the solution of
the model is a common feature of dynamic general equilibrium models.13 As
stressed by Iskrev (2010.b) the strength of identi￿cation varies across di⁄erent
regions in the parameter space. However, no multicollinearity is found in the
model.
The pair-wise correlations in terms of the model￿ s solution depend on where
we evaluate the partial derivatives and it is generally higher for ￿ equal to one.





high when ￿ is close to unity. Figure 8 shows that the highest correlation
between the two parameters can be found for ￿ = 0:98. This means that, for ￿
11Most of the literature on identi￿cation in DSGE models is concerned with the fact that
some parameters can be unidenti￿able due to the lack empirical relevance. Iskrev (2010.a
and 2010.b) distinguish between the statistical and the economic modelling aspects of identi-
￿cation. We focus on the tools provided by the author to examine how the identi￿cation of
parameters is in￿uenced by structural characteristics of the model.
12The analysis consists of evaluating the ranks of Jacobian matrices. The Jacobian matrix
@￿(￿)
@￿ must have full column rank in order for the parameters to be identi￿able. See Iskrev
(2010.a) for a description of the methodology.
13See Iskrev (2010.a) and Iskrev (2010.b). The latter paper also provides an application to
Smets and Wouters (2007) model see section 4.3.
19close to unity, small changes in ￿2 have very similar e⁄ects on the solution of
the model to changes in ￿. However, we ￿nd that the correlation between the
e⁄ects of the parameters on the model￿ s solution signi￿cantly varies with ￿ and
for values of ￿ below unity the linkage between parameters strongly declines. A
lower correlation means that it is less likely to reproduce the same e⁄ect of ￿
on the solution of the mode by changing other parameters.
5.3 Solution Method
Are the results robust to less stringent assumptions regarding the collateral
constraint?
As shown in section 3.2 the borrowing constraint is always binding in the
deterministic steady state. It is a common procedure in the business cycle liter-
ature to solve models with limits to borrowing ￿ la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
assuming that the constraint is also always binding in a neighborhood of the
steady state.14 In contrast, we allow for the constraint to be occassionally-
binding outside the steady state by solving the model using a "barrier method"
as in Kim, Kollmann and Kim (2010).15 Thus, we replace the inequality con-








In order to be able to use perturbation methods, we choose an exponential





The function is decreasing in the di⁄erence between bit and the endogenous
limit, ￿tEt [qt+1kit]. In practise, we solve an equivalent version of the model in
which higher borrowing is feasible but it is too costly to exceed the limit. The
derivative of the Penalty function with respect to bit replaces the shadow price
14See among others, Iacoviello and Minetti (2007), Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri
(2010), Campbell and Hercowitz (2005), Sterk (2010).
15See also Den Haan and Ocaktan (2009), Den Haan and De Wind (2010), Judd (1998),
and Preston and Roca (2007).




uc2 > 0; the two
versions of the model have the same deterministic steady state. However, di⁄er-
ently from an always binding constraint, the penalty function approach doesn￿ t
prevent impatient agents to borrow less than the debt limit in a neighborhood
of the steady state. Still, the penalty term, ￿0, discourages the agents from
violating the constraint, such that large values of ￿0 ensure that the indebted-
ness does not exceed the limit. In the benchmark solution, ￿0 equals 100. The
agents￿optimal choices of borrowing and capital, together with the equilibrium
conditions, represent a non-linear dynamic stochastic system of equations. To
capture the non-linearity induced by the asymmetric penalty function, we solve
for the recursive law of motion relying on a second order approximation.16
Figure 10 display the response of total output after a productivity shock
implied by the two solution methods. The di⁄erence between the two impulse-
responses is not sizable. As a result, the ￿rst period impact and the 20-quarter
cumulative e⁄ects are very similar. See Figure 11. Thus, for intermediate values
of ￿ the model with collateral constraint generate sizable ampli￿cation and
persistence even under less strict assumptions regarding the binding nature of
the constraint.
6 Conclusions
This paper improves upon previous literature by documenting the contribution
of ine¢ ciency in the debt enforcement procedure to the ampli￿cation of business
cycle ￿ uctuations which other authors have not considered. We argue that the
magnitude of ampli￿cation crucially depends on the fraction of the asset used
as a collateral in the credit market.
In accordance with previous papers that call into question the relevance
of collateralized debt as a transmission mechanism, we ￿nd that when ine¢ -
16Den Haan and De Wind (2009) solve the model by Deaton (1991) with a penalty func-
tion approach and show that, di⁄erently from higher order perturbation solutions, the policy
function of the second-order approximate solution is close to the accurate solution and that
despite being a bit more convex it preserves its shape. Further issues related to the use of
approximate solutions for generating simulated data are not of a concern for the purpose of
this paper.
21ciency in the debt enforcement process are not taken into account ￿i.e. ￿=1 ￿
collateral constraints predict negligible ampli￿cation of productivity shocks to
output. Nevertheless, when realistic Loan-to-Value ratios are assumed, the role
of collateral constraints in terms of the ampli￿cation of productivity shocks is
signi￿cantly enhanced, even under standard assumptions on the utility function
and production process. Thus, results presented by previous literature are not
robust to di⁄erent assumptions on the degree of ine¢ ciency in the credit market.
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Figure 1 Benchmark Model. Steady state productivity gap between the two groups of agents  (solid line 




Figure 2. Benchmark Model. Responses of the model economy to a one-period 1% increase in aggregate 
productivity;  γ=0.85. The vertical axes measure deviations from the steady state, while on the 
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Figure 3. Benchmark Model. Sensitivity of Output to a productivity shock for any given γ; second-period 







Figure 4.  Reproducible Capital Model. Sensitivity of Output to a productivity shock for any given γ; first-
period (left panel), second-period response (right panel). Dotted-line representative agent model; 
dashed-line benchmark model. 
 
 



























































Figure 5. Benchmark Model. Sensitivity of Output to a productivity shock for any given γ; second-period (left panel) and cumulative response over a 20 quarters 


































































































































Figure 6 Benchmark Model. Steady state productivity gap between the two groups of agents  (solid 





Figure 7. Benchmark Model. Sensitivity of Output to a productivity shock for any given β2; second-
period (left panel) and cumulative response over a 20 quarters period (right panel).  
 















































Figure 9.  Correlation between the column of the Jacobian w.r.t. γ and each of the other 
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Figure 10. Benchmark Model. Responses of total output to a one-period 1% increase in aggregate 
productivity; γ=0.85. The vertical axes measure deviations from the steady state, while on the 








Figure 11.Benchmark Model. Sensitivity of Output to a productivity shock for any given γ; second-
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